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Abstract. The impact of selected macroeconomic fundamentals on the market pressure
(MP) is assessed using the third generation models based on ‘Dusenberry’ adaptive
expectations. The findings are consistent with the general belief that weak macroeconomic
fundamentals had triggered the speculative attacks against the Asian currencies. However,
the macroeconomic variables and their dynamics that set the groundwork for a currency
crisis differ considerably in Malaysia and Indonesia. A speculative attack against the Rupiah
occurred in a generalized state of macroeconomic weakness while domestic credit growth,
the fiscal balances-GDP ratio and the real exchange rate exerted strong influence on the
exchange market pressure for Malaysia. In conclusion, while there are some common
fundamentals matter for shifting market expectations and hence, market pressure in
both countries, the dynamics that formed market expectations are divergent. Therefore,
the belief that the Asian economies had the same characteristics that triggered the currency
crisis in 1997 may be incorrect.
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Abstrak. Kesan makroekonomi fundamental ke atas tekanan pasaran (MP) ditafsir
menggunakan model generasi ketiga berasaskan jangkaan ‘adaptif ’ Dusenberry. Hasil
kajian ini tekal dengan anggapan umum bahawa fundamental makroekonomi yang lemah
telah mengakibatkan serangan ke atas matawang negara-negara Asia. Walau bagaimana-
pun, variabel makroekonomi serta dinamik variabel tersebut yang membawa kepada
krisis agak berbeza di Malaysia dan Indonesia. Serangan spekulatif terhadap rupiah berlaku
dalam keadaan makroekonomi yang lemah manakala tekanan terhadap Ringgit Malaysia
dikaitkan dengan pertumbuhan kredit, defisit fiskal dan kadar pertukaran benar.
Kesimpulannya, fundamental yang mempengaruhi jangkaan pasaran dan seterusnya
tekanan pasaran (MP) mungkin sama tetapi dinamik yang membentuk jangkaan pasaran
amat berbeza. Oleh yang demikian, anggapan bahawa ekonomi Asian mempunyai ciri-
ciri yang sama sehingga mengakibatkan krisis matawang 1997 mungkin tidak benar.
Kata kunci: krisis matawang; Indonesia; Malaysia; fundamental.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Asian economies including Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia that were
severely affected by the currency crisis of 1997-98, have prompted studies into
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their sudden economic decline and the emergence of widespread financial sector
frailties. These countries were once the second tier ‘dragons’ or ‘miracle
economies’ due to their impressive growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Empirical analyses that emerged mostly used panel data regression assuming that
these Asian economies are similar in characteristics and in the fundamentals that
trigger speculative attacks against their currencies. However, these Asian economies
seem similar in a broad sense mainly due to their level of economic development
and geographical proximity within South-East Asia. Moreover, even the common
macroeconomic fundamentals will have varying degrees of influence on the
economy.
This study sets out to confirm the belief that these countries are essentially
heterogeneous. However, we focus is on 2 Asian economies, Malaysia and Indonesia,
that contracted by 7% and 13%, respectively, following the speculative attacks.
These two geographically close countries achieved high economic growth in the
period prior to the crisis at 10% and 7.8% in 1996 for Malaysia and Indonesia,
respectively. However, the pace of economic recovery was vastly different; Indonesia
achieved a 3% growth (2001) compared to the 5.8% (1998) for Malaysia. The
research has found that based on a common set of macroeconomic fundamentals
in a model of country exchange market pressure (MP) (a high MP is defined as a
currency crisis) in the setting of Duesenberry’s adaptive expectations, the
macroeconomic fundamentals that influence market expectations not only differ
in importance but also in their dynamics. The macroeconomic fundamentals used
here have been widely used in previous studies including those that focus on
contagion and twin crisis such as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Caramazza
et al. (2000). A survey on the characteristics of crisis economies in the 1980s and
1990s (Lim, 2005) have shown that domestic credit growth, the fiscal balances-
GDP ratio, the real exchange rate, the current account balances-GDP ratio and
the reserves-M2 ratio, have consistently shown similar behaviour in the pre-crisis
period in the Mexican and Chilean crisis (1980s) and in Malaysia, Thailand, South
Korea and Indonesia in 1997-1998. An examination of the macroeconomic
fundamentals showed that the occurrence of a currency crisis have been more
frequent in the case of Indonesia, whereby the current account-balance-GDP ratio
and the reserves-M2 ratio, especially, have been persistently weak throughout the
sample period of first quarter 1970 to fourth quarter 2001 (1970Q1-2001Q4).
This research contributes to the enormous volume of empirical studies on the
Asian crisis of 1997-98, mainly by focusing on specific countries. Unlike most
previous empirical studies that pool a number of emerging economies in a panel
data analysis,1 a more accurate estimate and information is obtained from country
specific analysis. This has serious implications for the implementation of policies
1 This implicitly assumes that the impact effects of macroeconomic fundamentals on market pressure
are the same across all the countries understudy.
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to correct economic imbalances.2 Section 1 reviews the theoretical literature and
the empirical studies on currency crisis. Section 2 sets out the MP model for
Malaysia and Indonesia based on Duesenberry adaptive expectations as well as
the expected relationships between the exchange market pressure index (MP)
and the macroeconomic variables. An overview of the data set for each country is
presented in Section 3. The results of the empirical analysis for Malaysia and
Indonesia are provided in Section 4, followed by conclusion in Section 5.
2.0 A REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE AND
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The models of currency crisis have evolved from the first generation models such
as Krugman (1979) and Agenor et al. (1992) whereby expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies that are inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate regime, lead to a
gradual loss in reserves and ultimately to a speculative attack against the currency,
which forces the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate. Second generation
currency crisis models {(e.g. Krugman (1996) and Obstfeld (1996))} focus on
instances when government policy reacts to changes in private behaviour or when
the government faces an explicit trade-off between the fixed exchange rate policy
and other macroeconomic goals. Changing market sentiments can alter
government trade-off, which may make the subsequent devaluation a self-fulfilling
crisis. Therefore, even when policies are consistent with the fixed exchange rate,
attack-conditional changes can shift the economy from a good ‘no attack’
equilibrium to a bad ‘attack’ equilibrium. The second generation models have also
extended the role of changing market expectations to ‘contagion’ in various forms:
through trade spillover, ‘monsoonal effects’ or pure contagion. The first two effects
are likely to be linked but pure contagion is generally ascribed to changes in market
sentiments that are not linked to deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals.
Contagion may be caused by informational frictions and herding behaviour since
the incentive of collecting country specific information may decline as the world
capital markets grow {(e.g Masson (1999); Eichengreen et al. (1996); Flood and
Marion (1998))}
The third generation models have extended the ideas of the first and second
generation models (the role of fundamentals and market expectations) to embrace
a wider open economy setting and have highlighted the importance of the highly
integrated world capital market. The simultaneous financial and currency crisis
are attributed to government policies (such as financial deregulation or explicit
(or implicit) guarantee schemes) that are inconsistent with the fixed exchange
rate; from where, moral hazard is present, when the government implicitly or
2 Poolability test have rejected the null hypothesis that the slopes of the macroeconomic variables for
the 4 Asian economies (including Malaysia and Indonesia) are homogeneous (Lim (2005)).
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explicitly guarantees all liabilities of the private sector (bank deposits or corporate
debts) (e.g. Aghion et al. (2001)). Even the belief that some borrowers are ‘too big
to fail’ is a channel for the transmission of financial shocks since they may encourage
capital inflows that banks eventually channel into risky or unprofitable projects.
The banking sector plays a central role as the main intermediary in the financial
system, especially in a developing country with an underdeveloped financial system
{(Chang and Valesco (1998, 1999))}.
In a previous study of the theoretical models of currency crisis and a survey of
the macroeconomic characteristics of 7 selected crisis economies in the 1980s and
1990s in Latin America and Asia, Lim (2005) concluded that all sectors of the
economy should be considered when identifying vulnerabilities on the eve of a
crisis. The country survey based on a set of selected macroeconomic variables
found 5 macroeconomic variables that consistently behaved in the same manner
in the period prior to a crisis in the 1980s and 1990s, specifically, domestic credit
growth, the fiscal balances-GDP ratio, the real exchange rate, the current account
balance-GDP ratio and reserves-M2 ratio (Lim, 2005).3
Bustelo’s (2000) non-empirical analysis attributes the Asian financial crisis to
over consumption and overinvestment, i.e., increase in domestic demand that
may be driven by expansionary domestic policies that ultimately lead to high short-
term external debt. He argued for the need for indicators of deficiencies that
would capture financial fragility that is associated with financial deregulation and
capital inflows. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) found that currency and financial
crisis are normally preceded by recessions or below normal growth, attributable
in part to deteriorating terms of trade, rising real appreciation and rising cost of
credit. Caramazza et al. (2000) concluded that a country’s vulnerability to a crisis
lies in external weaknesses, domestic imbalances, reserves adequacy and sensitivity
to trade and financial contagion. Declining growth and real appreciation increase
the probability of crisis. Trade spillovers from a devaluation and output contraction
of other countries are relevant for countries with weak external accounts.
3.0 METHODOLOGY
Despite the lack of a unifying theoretical model that links the strands of the first
generation, the second generation and third generation currency crisis models,
we believe that a currency crisis is the culmination of a multitude of macroeconomic
imbalances. In this empirical analysis, 5 macroeconomic variables suggested by
Lim (2005) were tested to determine, firstly, the impact effect of the macroeconomic
variables on the market pressure of Malaysia and Indonesia; and secondly, to
determine if country experiences differ significantly in terms of the models and
the dynamics that explain the respective market pressures.
3 Based on a set of selected 18 macroeconomic variables.
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The market pressure variable, MP, is a weighted average of the change in the
exchange rate and the loss in reserves, the weights being their respective variances.
The nominal exchange rate is defined as the value of a US dollar measured in
domestic currency. The relative importance of each variable for determining MP
and the nominal exchange rate, is shown in the elasticities of MP in the long run,
calculated at the regressor mean.
When the market perceives that the fundamentals (a credit boom, current
account deficits, fiscal deficits, a real appreciation and declining reserves adequacy)
are becoming increasingly inconsistent with the (implicit) peg, therefore, it launches
an attack (sell) on the currency, inducing reserves losses and consequently, a high
MP. Due to transactions costs, the market reacts to the changes in the state of the
fundamentals with a lag. We argue that it is reasonable to expect that the current
level of MP is determined by market expectations held in the previous period, of
the state of the fundamentals in the next period. Therefore, any change in the
nominal exchange rate is determined by ‘expected’ values of the macroeconomic
fundamentals in the current period and not by the actual values of those variables.
Moreover, this is even more likely in an integrated and highly fluid world capital
market, informational frictions (and possibly herding behaviour) and the growing
disincentive for collecting country specific information.
The dynamic third generation currency crisis model of MP (for Malaysia and
Indonesia, respectively) based on ‘Duesenberry’ adaptive expectations had been
estimated as follows:4
The definition of the variables used in this study is presented in Appendix 1.
The nominal exchange rate (under a flexible exchange rate) will tend to rise
when the market expects domestic credit growth to rise in the next period. This
impact will be magnified when the expected values are confirmed by the realized
changes at the end of the current period. An expected increase in fiscal deficits
will exert rising pressure on the nominal exchange rate since it may signal a loose
fiscal policy stance that can increase aggregate demand and trigger inflationary
pressure, increasing prices of non-tradable goods and contributing to a
deteriorating trade balance.
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4 The modelling of market expectations of the macroeconomic variables using Koyck lags and the
polynomial distributed lags have shown results and fit that are far inferior to the results obtained
for this model.
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An expected increase in the real exchange rate, i.e., a depreciating real exchange
rate will tend to exert upward pressure on MP if the increase is driven by rising
pressure on the nominal exchange rate in a fixed or tightly managed exchange
rate regime. This is highly probable if the market perceives rising macroeconomic
imbalances such as credit growth and rising stock of Non Performing Loans (NPLs)
and current account imbalances. However, a rising real exchange rate can effectively
improve the trade competitiveness of domestic exports. For small open economies
highly dependent on exports (as in the case of our sample countries) declining
trade and rising current account balances may signal impending economic
slowdown. Closely related to this, an expected decline in reserves-M2 ratio, i.e.,
rising reserves inadequacy tends to increase MP since the market foresees that
the stock of reserves will be inadequate to defend the exchange rate in the event of
a speculative attack.
When a multitude of weak macroeconomic variables are expected in the near
future, MP is more than likely to rise to extreme levels as pressure on the nominal
exchange rate rises sharply and as a consequence, the low reserves are depleted.
Therefore, a currency crisis happens under highly vulnerable macroeconomic
conditions. When the expected levels of the macroeconomic variables are
confirmed / realized by the changes at the end of the current period, then the
impact on MP is magnified; this is assuming that the changes have the expected
signs and are statistically significant.
4.0 THE BEHAVIOUR OF MP AND MACROECONOMIC
VARIABLES FOR MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA OVER THE
SAMPLE PERIOD 1970Q1 TO 2001Q4
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the main variables for Malaysia over the sample
period. Domestic credit growth fell in the mid-1980s during the banking and
economic crisis, recovering in the late 1980s following restructuring of the banking
sector. For the large part of the sample period, there was deficit fiscal balances;
fiscal surpluses were achieved from 1994 simultaneously with deficit current
account balances. The reserves-M2 ratio began to increase after 1985. The crisis
(third quarters of 1975 and 1997) are associated with real exchange rate
depreciation and low levels of reserves-M2 ratio and current account deficits. In
the earlier crisis there was low credit growth and large fiscal deficits but no
excessively high credit growth or fiscal deficits in the 1997 crisis.5 This suggests
the influence of a different economic and financial environment in the 1990s.
5 VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) tests for the possibility of multicollinearity find little evidence of
collinearity in the Malaysia and Indonesia data sets (VIF range are 1.06-1.3 and 1.05-1.81,
respectively) (Gujarati (1995) in Tan (2001)). With increasing multicollinearity in the data set
model estimates become unstable and standard errors of coefficients are inflated.
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Figure 1 Malaysia: Evolution of selected variable
MP for Malaysia tends to be mean reverting, and was high during the 1974-
1975 large current account deficits, in the early 1980s following the second oil
crisis ( and across the board fall in commodity prices) and the middle of the 1980s
during the economic and banking crisis. International reserves tended to decline
in the 2 years before a crisis while the nominal exchange rate tended to appreciate.
Market pressure was generally low in 1993-1994 due to strong capital inflows.
The reserve losses that are predicted to accelerate as market participants foresee
a speculative attack on the currency is less apparent in the recent crisis. As shown
in Figure 2 (components of MP) reserves losses constitute a very small proportion
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 Figure 2 Malaysia: Mp and components
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 Figure 3 Indonesia: Evolution of selected variables
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of MP mainly because of its large variance. MP is driven by the change in reserves
during the early 1970s and late 1990s. Reserves losses remain important because
of the economy’s dependence on international trade.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the main variables for Indonesia over the period
1970Q1-2001Q4. Generally, credit growth remained low and rising at the time of
crisis except in 1983. Fiscal surpluses were achieved from about 1989. Indonesia
had experienced current account deficits for most of the period except during
1979-1981. The reserves-M2 ratio was generally low till the onset of the 1997 crisis.
All the crisis are generally associated with low credit growth, current account deficits,
fiscal deficits (except the recent crisis), some real exchange rate appreciation (except
the 1978 crisis) and low reserves-M2 ratios (especially from the 1980s).
Movement in MP for Indonesia is marked by two crisis after 1978 and is clustered
in the 1990s. Between 1970s and 1996, there were three separate occasions of
depreciating pressure on the nominal exchange rate. Declining reserves were
less apparent in the recent crisis. Market pressure remained volatile after the
1998 crisis, aggravated by political uncertainties in 1999 and 2000. The change in
the nominal exchange rate constitutes 99.99%-100% of MP for Indonesia. The
low MP before 1978 was driven by rising international reserves associated with
the 1970s oil price shocks. The significance of reserves for maintaining the
exchange is apparent in the 1990s; the spikes in Figure 4 show depreciating
pressure on the crawling peg and rising reserves losses in 1997-98.
Clearly, currency crisis has been more frequent in Indonesia. The state of the
macroeconomic fundamentals were common to the extent that both countries
had current account deficit during a crisis (in the 1990s in Malaysia and more
persistently for Indonesia). In both cases, MP tended to rise to extreme (crisis)
levels when macroeconomic fundamentals were weak. If a generalized state of
weak fundamentals tended to push MP for Indonesia to high (crisis) levels, the
movements in MP for Malaysia were influenced by slightly different macroeconomic
fundamentals; MP was associated with fiscal deficits in the 1970s but domestic
credit growth gained prominence in the 1990s.
5.0 DATA ANALYSIS
The data for Malaysia are generally stationary. ADF and Phillip-Perron tests show
that MP for Malaysia, domestic credit growth, the real exchange rate (Rer) and
the current account-GDP ratio (Ca) are I(0). These variables are zero-mean,
stationary processes except for domestic credit growth. The fiscal balances-GDP
ratio is stationary around a linear trend at 1% significance (5% by the ADF test).
The reserves-M2 ratio is I(1). Therefore, the first difference of reserves-M2 ratio
(denoted ÄRM2) is used in estimation.
The Indonesia macroeconomic variables are stationary. MP and domestic credit
growth are stationary zero mean processes at the 1% significance level according
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to ADF and Phillip-Perron tests. The fiscal balances-GDP ratio and the real
exchange rate are stationary, zero-mean processes according to the Phillip-Perron
tests. The current account balances–GDP ratio is stationary around a linear trend.
The reserves-M2 ratio, assuming a non-zero mean, are also I(0). (Appendix 2
details the results of the unit root tests)
6.0 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The estimates for the Malaysia MP model based on ‘Duesenberry’ adaptive
expectations is shown in Table 1. The estimates are unbiased, consistent but may
be inefficient, and the RESET test indicates correct functional form. The Hausman-
Wu test shows that the residuals are also independent of the explanatory variables.
A stable AR(1) process is included to correct for autocorrelation (the inverted
root has a modulus less than 1).
The MP Malaysia equation has a statistically significant negative intercept. The
model is significant at 1% with 2R = 0.94. The fitted MP tracks the actual MP very
closely except at the extreme ends of the sample period (see Figure 5). The poor
fit for the early 1970s is due to the lack of data; the extreme volatility in 1999 is
underestimated perhaps due to the lack of pertinent data, e.g. the external
liabilities.
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 Figure 5 Malaysia: Actual and fitted values of MP
In the MP equation, the expected increase in domestic credit growth and the
deficit fiscal balances-GDP ratio have the anticipated signs. The expected
depreciation and actual increase in the real exchange rate tend to exert upward
pressure on MP. All the variables are significant at the 5% significance level.
At the regressor mean, a one percent expected increase in domestic credit
growth and in the fiscal deficits-GDP ratio will raise MP by 0.6% and 0.4%
respectively. Of all the macroeconomic variables, the real exchange rate is evidently
the most crucial for Malaysia; a 1% expected depreciation results in a net 1.4%
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Table 1 Least squares estimations of market pressure (Mp)
   MALAYSIA INDONESIA
Variable Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity
(Std error) (sample mean)  (Std error) (sample mean)
Constant -3.341** –
(1.597)
DLDCREDIT(-1) 38.311** 0.64 21.191** 0.505
(18.423) (10.809)
∇(DLDCREDIT) – 22.672* -0.01
– (7.517)
BDEF(-1) -0.207* 0.39 –
0.07)
D(BDEF) – – –
RER(-1) 118.80* 1.087 1.541*** -0.60
(15.414) (0.834)
D(RER) 883.511* –
(22.853) 0.301
CA(-1) – -0.748** 0.40
(0.292)
∇(CA) – 1.481* 0.02
(0.52)
RM2(-1) – 8.955*** 0.94
(5.19)
∇(RM2) – 70.323* -0.01
(16.76)
AR(1) AR(2) 0.3026*
0.517* (0.083)            (0.098)
Inverted AR roots: 0.52 0.55     -0.55
Summary statistics Summary statistics
R 2 0.94 0.25
Regression s. e. 6.91 8.60
RSS 5192.25 7918.54
No. observations 115 114
Sample period 1973Q2- 1973Q3-
2001Q4 2001Q4
Diagnostics
Normality test 0.73  (0.69) 2173.3  (0.00)
Serial correlation 1.18 (0.76) 1.44 (0.49)
(2 lags)
ARCH effects 0.55  (0.45) 12.34  (0.14)
Heteroscedasticity 25.88  (0.03) 81.77  (0.00)
RESET test 1.13  (0.71) 1.42  (0.23)
Note:
*, **, and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.
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Figure 6 Indonesia: Actual and fitted values of MP
rise in MP (expected depreciation itself raised MP by 1.1%). In this specification,
the influence of the other variables (the current account balance-GDP ratio and
the reserves-M2 ratio) is probably subsumed in the real exchange rate.
For Indonesia, the model estimates are consistent but inefficient. The = 0.25,
strongly indicate the omission of some pertinent variables. Despite the possible
omitted variable bias, the model still provides some information regarding the
macroeconomic fundamentals that have significant influence on market
expectations and MP. The RESET test does not indicate incorrect functional form
despite non-normality in the residuals. The presence of heteroscedasticity captured
the outlier effects. The residuals are independent of the regressors. Table 2 (right
panel) shows the estimation results for Indonesia. Figure 6 shows the fitted and
actual values of MP. The fitted values track the actual values quite closely, predicting
accurately the 1978 crisis but underestimating the magnitude of the other crisis,
although showing the expected rise at the appropriate crisis points.
The variables in this model are jointly significantly different from zero at 1%.
The effect of the expectations of domestic credit growth, the real exchange rate,
the reserves-M2 ratio and the current account–GDP ratio are significant at 5%-
10% and the realized changes (or current period trend) for credit growth and the
reserves-M2 ratio are significant at 1%. The variables have the expected signs and
an increase in the reserves-M2 ratio and an expected depreciation tend to increase
MP. At the mean, a 1% expected increase in reserves-M2 ratio raises MP by 0.94%
and for an expected real appreciation, by 0.6%. MP rises by 0.4% due an expected
increase in deficit current account balances. Expected domestic credit growth
raises MP by a half percent. The realized changes in domestic credit growth and
the reserves-M2 ratio marginally lower their respective impact on MP. Therefore,
according to our model specification for Indonesia, an expected increase in the
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reserves-M2 ratio and a real exchange rate appreciation are the most important
variables that affect MP.
To summarise, the fundamentals that render Malaysia and Indonesia vulnerable
to a currency crisis are the real exchange rate and domestic credit growth. These
are indications of incompatible domestic policies with the implicit pegs of their
currencies. In the 1980s, expansionary fiscal policy associated with high oil prices
and domestic credit expansion following partial financial liberalization in Indonesia
lead to inflationary pressure and an appreciating real exchange rate. These
macroeconomic imbalances culminated in current account deficits and growing
reserves inadequacy. The crisis in the 1990s are very likely linked to the major
financial liberalization measures that were adopted in both countries, which led
to vast foreign capital inflows, rapid growth in domestic lending and the resultant
rising stock of NPLs and external debts. For the Malaysian economy, declining
trade surpluses associated with weak world electronic demand and an appreciating
real exchange rate eroded trade competitiveness especially compared to low cost
countries like China and Vietnam. Rising interest rate drew in more foreign capital
effectively escalated the debt servicing obligations of the private sector. The
openness of the economy, rising macroeconomic weaknesses and growing external
debts (with rising short term debts) increased the vulnerability of the economy to
shocks. In the second quarter of 1997 the Malaysian ringgit came under intense
pressure when the Baht came under intensive attack. In Indonesia, major reforms
in the domestic financial market (1998) and foreign investment laws in 1994 drew
in foreign capital which largely went to the private sector, intermediated by
domestic private banks. The Rupiah effectively appreciated and became less
competitive. Slowing economic growth, current account deficits, rising short-term
debts and NPLs rendered the economy highly vulnerable to weak market
sentiments and shocks in the region. The different dynamics (evident in the
empirical analysis) also underscores their heterogeneity and underscores the
importance of country specific analysis. A common policy recommendation for a
set of ‘seemingly similar’ countries can have detrimental effects on the economy.
This concurs with the findings of Abdul Abiad (2003) who strongly suggested the
need to firstly determine those macroeconomic fundamentals are similar before
embarking on panel data estimation for the reason stated above.
7.0 CONCLUSION
The models of MP for Malaysia and Indonesia, based on ‘Duesenberry’ adaptive
expectations imply that market expectations of the macroeconomic variables are
determined by market’s past knowledge of the macroeconomic variables and the
trend of their variables in the current period. As we have expected, countries may
have similar economic characteristics in a broad sense but the dynamics of the
macroeconomic variables that influence MP differ considerably. What they have
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in common is the crucial role of the real exchange rate for forming market
expectations. In both instances, MP rises with market expectations of a depreciation
(and the realized increase in the real exchange rate). This is not unexpected given
the way MP is defined. Domestic credit growth is also very important for Malaysia.
MP for Indonesia is also strongly influenced by market expectations of the fiscal
balances-GDP ratio and reserves adequacy. A rising trend in reserves-M2 ratio
exerts pressure on MP indicating the potentially adverse effects when strong capital
inflow trends come to a sudden stop and reverse. Our findings further confirms
the diversity in Asian countries and iterates that a standard policy prescription
for a group of crisis economies may be inappropriate considering their underlying
differences. The currency crisis should be analyzed on an individual country basis.
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APPENDIX 1
Definition of  estimated variables
Definition
Market pressure is a weighted average of the change in
exchange rate and the change (losses) in international
reserves, and the weights are equal to the inverse of the
variances of the variables.
Domestic credit growth is measured as a first difference
of the natural logarithm of domestic credit. Domestic
credit growth is expected to have a positive effect on MP.
Fiscal balances-GDP ratio is derived by dividing fiscal
balances (IFS line 680..ZF) with nominal GDP (line
699..ZF) and the product multiplied by 100. It is expected
to have a negative effect on market pressure, i.e. rising
fiscal surpluses (fiscal prudence) should exert downward
pressure on market pressure (other things being equal).
The real exchange rate is measured in two steps. We first
take the natural logarithms of the average exchange rate
(IFS line RF) multiplied by US consumer price index
(line USI63) divided by domestic consumer price index
(IFS line 63). Second, subtract the first figure from their
past 12-quarter average. This two-step procedure is a
measure of the deviation of real exchange rate from its
three years previous average. A positive (negative) real
exchange rate indicates a real depreciation (appreciation).
Real exchange rate can have a positive or a negative effect
on MP. (Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Corsetti et al.
(1998) and Sachs et al. (1996).
Current account balances-GDP ratio is obtained by
converting current account balances (IFS line 878) to
domestic currency values using period average exchange
rates (IFS line RF) and dividing the product by nominal
GDP (IFS line 899..ZF) multiplied by 100. It is expected
to have a negative impact on market pressure since rising
current account balances may imply an accumulation of
reserves sufficient to defend the currency in the event of
a depreciating speculative attack.
The reserves to broad money ratio is derived as foreign
reserves (IFS line 11d) converted to domestic currency values
using end of period exchange rate (IFS line AE) divided by
broad money (IFS lines 34 plus 35). This variable measures
reserves adequacy or financial fragility. It can have a positive
or negative impact on market pressure.
Variable
Market
pressure
Domestic credit
growth
Fiscal
balances-GDP
ratio
Real exchange
rate
Current
account-GDP
ratio
Reserves-M2
ratio
Symbol
MP
Dldcredit
Bdef
Rer
Ca
RM2
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APPENDIX 2
Unit root tests
Variable Malaysia Data Set Indonesia Data Set
ADF Phillip-Perron ADF Phillip-Perron
MP statistic -7.48* -7.3* statistic -6.87* -8.53*
No. of lags 0 4 No. of lags 2 2
No intercept, No intercept,
no trend   no trend   
    
Dldcredit statistic -2.19** -5.12* statistic -5.375* -9.48*
No. of lags 2 4 No. of lags 1 4
No intercept, No intercept,
no trend    no trend   
    
Bdef statistic -3.15* -11.44* statistic -2.25* -6.68*
No. of lags 9 10 No. of lags 6 4
Intercept, No intercept,
trend   no trend   
    
Rer statistic -3.59* -2.78*** statistic -2.46** -1.77***
No. of lags 1 4 No. of lags 1 6
No intercept, No intercept,
no trend   no trend   
    
Ca statistic -2.41* -7.155* statistic -4.22** -7.2*
No. of lags 4 4 No. of lags 1 7
No intercept, Intercept,
no trend    trend   
 (variable in first differences)    
RM2 statistic -9.21*  statistic -3.02** -3.18**
No. of lags 0 -9.12* No. of lags 0 4
No intercept, Intercept,
no trend  4 no trend
Note:  *, **, ***  denote 1%, 5%  and  10% significance level.
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